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Summary
Strategic inventories, as opposed to inventories carried for well-documented rea-
sons such as cycle inventories, pipeline inventories, safety inventories, etc., refer to
the inventories held purely out of strategic considerations. In this thesis, we first
concern ourselves with the roles of strategic inventories under supply chain con-
tracting models when bargaining framework is fully or partially implemented, and
study their impacts on trading terms, supply chain performance and coordination.
We next address the problem when horizontal competition between supply chains
is introduced, and further explore the respective scenarios accordingly.
In the first part of this thesis, we investigate the existence and the effect of
strategic inventories for a single supply chain where the supplier and the retailer
bargain for the trading terms. For a two-period problem, we consider both the case
of bargaining taking place in both periods and the scenario where the two parties
bargain only in one period. We compare our results with those for the scenario
where the supplier and the retailer trade under a Stackelberg game framework.
For scenarios when competition exists in vertical controls, strategic inventories
viii
Summary ix
can be used to break suppliers monopoly power and reduce the channel profit
loss due to double marginalization effect. Retailer can also be incentivized to
hold inventories to in effect enhance her bargaining power when negotiation is to
take place. However, if cooperation occurs throughout the entire time horizon,
inventories are not held in optimal contract due to a drain of additional holding
from the channel profit. On the other hand, when the chain is in a transition phase,
supplier intends to avoid such a threat, and the vertical competition is actually
intensified.
We then introduce horizontal competition between supply chains into the sys-
tem and study how the impact of strategic inventories changes correspondingly.
Taking into account interactions between two parallel chains, inventories contin-
ue to play strategic roles in vertical controls, and other influences are speculated
too. Proven to be strategic substitutes to each other, strategic inventories carried
by competitive chains partially constitute their respective sales quantities, and
the strategic complementarity between sales quantities are thus partially replaced.
Consequently, larger sales quantities are realized, the gap to first-best optimal is
bridged, and horizontal competition is softened with both chains mutually bene-
fitted. Lastly, inventories are used as a commitment tool of one chain to the other
to avoid concurrence of large sales quantities when two-time intra-chain bargain-
ing framework is adopted. Under a decision of holding inventories beforehand,
one chain is to substantially commit to a pre-determined sales quantity, in order
to sustain the collusive behavior to induce the system to approach the first-best
outcome.
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Strategic inventories, as opposed to inventories carried for well-cited reasons such
as cycle, pipeline, safety inventories, etc. (cf. [3, 15, 22]), refer to the inventories
held by the downstream firm (for instance, retailer) purely out of strategic con-
siderations in a single vertical supply chain positioned in a dynamic model; see
[1]. In their model, all the foreseeable conventional reasons to carry inventories
are eliminated. Empowered to carry forward inventories across periods, retailer
is shown to indeed store inventories in the optimal solution, which, compared to
a static model, alters (most likely escalates) both entities’ and channel profits, as
well as the total consumer welfare.
The study of strategic inventories is related to many models of supplier-buyer
interactions included in the supply contract literature. The readers may refer to
[6, 19, 11] for excellent literature reviews in this field. The study of non-cooperative
play has been emerging recently because the incentives of the supply chain par-
ties are typically not aligned, leading to individually optimal decisions that harm
the overall supply chain performance. Early research mainly focused on the static
models. For example, Corbett and de Groote [8], Ha [12], and Corbett et al [9]
1
2considered that suppliers are not privy to the cost structure of the buyer and opti-
mal contracts for the supplier tend to be quantity discount contracts, and Cachon
and Zhang [7] studied a queueing model with information asymmetry on costs.
However, dynamic procurement is more commonly observed in practice so inven-
tory dynamics are more essential to supply chain coordination. For the case of
infinite horizon, there is a growing body of literature addressing the inefficiencies
due to the profit-relevant non-contractible actions of parters; see, e.g., Debo and
Sun [10], Taylor and Plambeck [17, 18], Ren et al [16], Tunca and Zenios [20], or
Belavina and Girotra [4]. It has been shown that when the discount rate for fu-
ture profits is sufficiently high, short-term gains from unilateral deviations prevent
supply chain collaboration so that long-term collaborative relationships are not
sustainable. For the case of finite horizon, Anand et al [1] is one of the first papers
that studies strategic inventories for vertical controls in a two-echelon supply with
a multi-period setting. The authors showed that buyers optimal strategy is to hold
inventories to reduce the supplier’s monopoly power and lower future prices, and
the supplier is unable to prevent this strategy. Keskinocak et al [14] extended the
model from Anand et al [1] to study strategic inventories in a situation where the
suppliers first period capacity is limited. Other recent research includes Zhang et
al [21], Anand et al [2] and Zhang et al [21], to name only a few. In addition,
very recently, Hartwig et al [13] presented the experimental test of the effect of
strategic inventories on supply chain performance.
The observation and its auxiliary analysis to the role of strategic inventories
in optimal contracting stated in the dynamic model appeal to us primarily due
to its resemblance to a bargaining framework of our recall. As postulated by
authors, retailer is believed to use her storage of inventories to force supplier to
lower the period 2 wholesale price, which seems in nature like a reconstruction of
the leader-follower structure and a rise of negotiation. Meanwhile, the differences
3are rather significant too, a major one being that, a bargaining framework for
single chain usually mimics upshots from a centralized system, in which double
marginalization ceases. It arouses our suspicion in both the presence and the
role of strategic inventories if a bargaining framework, which appears considerably
powerful and efficient, is established, will strategic inventories still be held had any
form of the cooperation been implemented? Will the change of model structure
revise or reverse the role of strategic inventories? These are the typical questions
to our concerns.
To answer the above questions, we extend the work of Anand et al [1] on
the dynamic leader-follower model by introducing cooperations into the vertical
control in the format of bilateral bargaining, to replace or partially substitute
the leader-follower structure in the sequential-move game. In this thesis, we first
investigate the existence and the effect of strategic inventories for a single supply
chain where supplier and retailer bargain for the trading terms. For a two-period
problem, we consider both the cases of bargaining taking place in both periods and
that the two parties bargain only for once at the start of period 1. Later, we also
include the scenarios when supply chain is in transition from a cooperative game
to a non-cooperative game and the other way round, and compare our results with
the dynamic model.
The next issue we would address is that, although shown to play a powerful
role in supply chain coordination for the single chain scenario, when horizontal
competition exists — which is usually what to expect in the market — bargaining
seems to lose its dominant power. In fact, later in this thesis, we recap on an
interesting result that, even the leader-follower setting in which horizontal and
vertical competitions both exist could surpass bargaining in terms of the channel
profit especially when horizontal competition is intense. Therefore, we would like
4to further explore how bargaining will affect, and be affected by strategic invento-
ries under a setting of two parallel supply chains, and how will the supply chain
performance and coordination change accordingly. We thence carry on the set of
studies to a system of two supply chains with horizontal competition incorporated
and further inspect how the impact of strategic inventories extends and changes.
For the rest of this thesis, we first present the single-chain models and results,
as well as highlight some of our findings and analysis in Chapter 2. Two cooper-
ative models, one in Section 2.1.1 with a one-time bargaining, and the other with
bilateral bargaining in both periods as discussed in Section 2.1.2, along with an-
other two transitive models in Sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.4, the former with bargaining
in the first period and leader-follower in the second and the other way round for
the latter, are delivered together with their optimal contracts. In Chapter 3, five
double-chain models incorporated with horizontal competition, as extensions to
the dynamic model as well as the above four single-chain models, are to our major
interests. Traditional reasons to carry inventories are also absent under a similar
set of assumptions, yet we show that inventories are still stored in some optimal
contracts, and will emphasize imitations and updates on their strategic roles in
comparison with the single-chain models.
Chapter2
Models and Analysis of Single Supply
Chain with Vertical Competition and
Cooperation
We first summarize the results of several existing models of a single supply chain
to facilitate comparisons to our studies later in this chapter. We consider a supply
chain consisting of a single supplier S and a single retailer R for the wholesale and
retail of a single product. Throughout the thesis, we normalize the unit produc-
tion cost to be zero, assume zero lead time and deterministic demand with linear
demand curve, and the market clearing price corresponding to a sales quantity q
is p(q) = a − bq with a, b fixed over the entire time horizon and known to both
business entities. For each unit of inventory, a holding cost h > 0 is incurred per
period, and salvage value is taken to be zero to eliminate arbitrage. The above
assumptions are made for a purpose of excluding the traditional reasons for storage
of inventories, yet, in one of the following models, inventories are still chosen to
be held strategically in the optimal contract.
5
6To start with, there are a few single-period models, one being the centralized
system, namely supplier and retailer are coordinated so that the channel profit is
maximized. The optimal sales quantity, known as the first-best optimal, qfb = a/2b
and the channel profit ΠfbC = a
2/4b. A static bargaining framework under which
both supplier and retailer negotiate over the wholesale price w and sales quantity q
as trading terms, modelled through a generalized Nash bargaining [5], will generate
the first-best sales quantity and achieve the first-best channel profit, the allocation
of which is governed by the ratio of supplier’s and retailer’s bargaining powers and





(ΠS −DS)1−α(ΠR −DR)α | ΠS ≥ DS,ΠR ≥ DR
}
,
where α ∈ [0, 1] denotes the beginning power of the retailer, (DS, DR) denotes the
disagreement point, ΠS and ΠR represent the supplier and retailer profits taking
the form ΠS := wq, ΠR = (p − w)q, and ΠC represents the channel profit, i.e.,
ΠC := ΠS +ΠR. Note that the optimal solution q
∗ = qfb and the resulting channel
profit Π∗C = Π
fb
C is universal for any α and any disagreement point (DS, DR).
Another classic static (single-period) model in which supplier quotes a linear
wholesale price w followed by retailer responding with a procurement quantity
q and retailing at the market clearing price, is naturally a leader-follower game
with supplier and retailer taking the roles of up- and downstream firms. The
optimal contract, determined sequentially by supplier and retailer to maximize
their individual profits, is set as follows: w = a/2, q = a/4b and the respective




Note that to compare the leader-follower outcome with that to the centralized
system, a loss of a quarter of the first-best channel profit arises from the well-
documented double marginalization effect: The chain is pushed towards a less
7coordinated direction when the vertical competition is intensified between up- and
downstream firms, leading to a lower sales quantity and thus, a loss for the channel.
To discuss the two-period models, we follow closely the work from [1] with
the emphasis on two stylized leader-follower games. On top of extending the
time horizon to two period, they introduce dynamics by allowing carrying forward
inventories from period 1 to period 2, but specify that all purchase/held on-hand
quantities must be sold at the end of period 2. Both retailer’s ability to hold, as
well as the exact amount of inventories are public information. All the previous
assumptions made for single-period models still apply to preclude the traditional
types of inventories. Notation-wise, superscript t = 1, 2 is used wherever applicable
to signify the respective period. For a commitment model, supplier quotes w1, w2
both at the start of period 1 and credibly commits to such a price menu over the
entire time horizon. Retailer, in period 1 procures Q1 from supplier at a wholesale
price of w1, sells to the market q1 ≤ Q1 and holds any excess I = Q1 − q1 as
inventories at a unit cost of h. In period 2, retailer purchases Q2 at a wholesale
price of w2, and sells together with the inventories I to the market of a total
amount of q2 = Q2 + I. The optimal outcome states a zero inventory I = 0, and
the model degenerates to a duplicate of repeated static game. A more interesting
model is that supplier quotes wholesale prices dynamically at the start of respective
periods while the rest of the events remain in order. The optimal outcome for
such a dynamic model is different from that of the commitment case for a broad
spectrum of parameters and suggests a different set of mechanics between the
up- and downstream firms in respects. In particular, when the dynamic optimal is
diversified from the commitment, I > 0 is chosen, ΠS is always higher, and ΠR,ΠC
increase as well for a reasonably wide range of parameter values, namely retailer
indeed chooses to carry inventories across periods and under most circumstances
both entities as well as the channel concurrently benefit from such a strategic move.
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Note that the inventories arise purely from incentive concerns, and the authors
identify the observable marked-down w2 as a product of these inventories, i.e.
retailer exploits inventories to force supplier to lower the period 2 wholesale price.
The chain can usually benefit from the strategic move for double marginalization
effect is expected to be diminished oftentimes.
The observation and its auxiliary analysis to the role of strategic inventories
in optimal contracting stated in [1] appeal to us primarily due to its resemblance
to a bargaining framework of our recall. Meanwhile, the differences are rather
significant too, a major one being that, a bargaining framework usually mimics
upshots from a centralized system, in which double marginalization ceases. It
arouses our suspicion in both the presence and the role of strategic inventories
if a bargaining framework, which appears considerably powerful and efficient, is
stylized. Will strategic inventories still be held had any form of the cooperation
been implemented? Will the change of model structure revise or reverse the role
of strategic inventories? These are the typical questions to our concerns.
To answer the above questions, we extend the precedents’ work on the dynamic
leader-follower model by introducing cooperations into the vertical control in the
format of bilateral bargaining, to replace or partially substitute the leader-follower
setting in the sequential-move game. We will present our work on models and
results followed by the comparisons and analysis in the succeeding subsections.
2.1 Models and Results
For notational simplicity, throughout this chapter of single supply chain, we use
pt := p(qt) = a−bqt to denote the clearing price in period t, t = 1, 2, if no confusion
arises.
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2.1.1 Cooperation with One-time Bargaining
Supplier and retailer bilaterally bargain over the wholesale prices wt and sales
quantities qt for both periods t = 1, 2 as well as I, the amount of inventories
carried over between periods, all in one shot at the beginning of period 1, in order
to maximize their joint utility established in a generalized Nash bargaining game
with retailer’s bargaining power vis-a-vis supplier indexed by α ∈ [0, 1]. Storage
for each unit of inventories is charged h per period. A failure in negotiation leads
to a zero-profit for both entities. Let ΠtS and Π
t
R, respectively, denote the profit













(ΠS −DS)1−α(ΠR −DR)α | ΠS ≥ DS,ΠR ≥ DR
}
,
where (DS, DR) is the disagreement point. It is natural that the supplier and
retailer profits are zeros if they never reach an agreement. Thus, we choose DS =
DR = 0. More specifically,
Π1S = w
1(q1 + I), Π1R = p
1q1 − w1(q1 + I)− hI, (2.1)
Π2S = w
2(q2 − I), Π2R = p2q2 − w2(q2 − I). (2.2)
Recall that pt = a− bqt, t = 1, 2. This maximization problems has infinite optimal
solutions satisfying
w1∗ + w2∗ = (1− α)a, q1∗ = q2∗ = a
2b
(= qfb), I∗ = 0.




(= ΠfbC ), Π
t∗
S = (1− α)ΠtC , Πt∗R = αΠtC , t = 1, 2.
See the detailed derivation in Appendix A.1.
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By implementing a one-time bargaining, the strategic inventory is gone while
the first-best optimal is achieved, which aligns with our expectation that a cen-
tralized system is effectively realized. Furthermore, retailer’s ability in carrying
inventories does not virtually change the chain coordination, which indicates such
a bargaining is adequately effectual. Nevertheless, we could not help but wonder
if the efficacy stems from the bargaining structure itself or, on the contrary, the
static nature of the model that parallels the commitment contracting? Such a
doubt leads us onto the investigation of next model.
2.1.2 Cooperation with Two-time Bargaining
Unlike the one-time bargaining setting, the double-bargaining model permits two
entities to carry out negotiations one at the start of each period. Wherefore, rather
than being “static” in a sense as the single-bargaining, the dynamics could now
exist and any price gap between periods is possible. We are interested in seeing
what the optimal contract would look like and model the negotiations as follows.







)α | Π2S ≥ D2S,Π2R ≥ D2R} ,
where the profits Π2S, Π
2
R take the forms in (2.2) and D
2
S = 0, D
2
R = p(I)I. Here,
the disagreement point (D2S, D
2
R) are defined this way on the grounds that, when
negotiation fails, supplier walks away with nothing while retailer can still profit
from the sales of strategic inventories. Note that the period-2 model depends on
the inventory quantity I brought from period 1. We hereby use Π2∗S (I) and Π
2∗
R (I)
to denote the profits of supplier and retailer under the optimal contract in period
2, respectively. This notation will also be used in other two-period models of single
chain in the sequel.
2.1 Models and Results 11




(ΠS −DS)1−α(ΠR −DR)α | ΠR ≥ DR, ΠS ≥ DS
}
,












R taking the forms
in (2.1). We set DS = DR = 0 by regulating that a failed negotiation at the start
of the entire time horizon will cease the operation of the chain. Alternatively, an
assumption of DS = DR = a
2/4b is also sensible and will not change the optimal
outcome. The optimal contract yields
w1∗ = w2∗ =
(1− α)a
2
, q1∗ = q2∗ =
a
2b
(= qfb), I∗ = 0,




(= ΠfbC ), Π
t∗
S = (1− α)Πt∗C , Πt∗R = αΠt∗C , t = 1, 2.
See the detailed derivation in Appendix A.2.
Up to now, we have seen I∗ = 0 in optimal contracting for both one- and two-
time bargaining models, in which centralized coordinations are achieved. In other
words, bargaining framework seems way too compelling that it completely retrieves
any loss due to double marginalization effect, henceforth, covers the strategic role
of inventories and even dominates it. In contrast, under a dynamic leader-follower
framework, strategic inventories, although implicitly seen and postulated by [1]
as a contracting tool of the downstream firm to acquire a lower future wholesale
price quoted by the upstream, has in fact reduced double marginalization and
improved channel coordination; for a sufficiently broad spectrum of parameters,
strategic inventories appear in optimal contracts. On this account, we intend to
continue to inspect the optimal contracts when bargaining is integrated partially
to the dynamic model. Furthermore, we care to explore into more details how the
inventories play a strategic role in each period respectively, inspired by a percep-
tive trade-off in retailer’s period-1 and -2 profits (for an anticipation of retailer’s
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strategic move of storing inventories, leading to a foreseeable lower period-2 w-
holesale price, will motivate supplier’s raising period-1’s wholesale price, causing
higher cost for retailer’s overall period-1 orders ). We could exploit results in Sec-
tion 2.1.2 that period-by-period negotiations do not trigger storage of strategic
inventories and outcross it with a leader-follower setting to rack up two dynamic
models to our interests, namely bargaining in the first period and leader-follower
in the second demonstrated in Section 2.1.3, and vice versa, as in Section 2.1.4.
Veritably, these two models, demonstrating the transition phases from cooperation
to leader-follower or the other way round, are also of practical values in operational
management. We will first present modelling and results for the former of the two
transitive models.
2.1.3 Bargaining + Leader-follower
Now we study a transition from bargaining to leader-follower framework.
Period 2: Presuming an inventory quantity I from period 1 and a wholesale price





p2q2 − w2(q2 − I)} .
Knowing the response curve of retailer denoted by q2∗(w2), supplier determines





Period 1: Suppler and retailer jointly determine the wholesale price w1, the sales
quantity q1 and the inventory quantity I, aiming to maximize the utility of profit
2.1 Models and Results 13




(ΠS −DS)1−α(ΠR −DR)α | ΠS ≥ DS,ΠR ≥ DR
}
,












R taking the forms
in (2.1), and the disagreement point (DS, DR) is defined as the profits that retailer
and supplier could achieve when the cooperation fails. Taking into account of the
leader and follower’s roles, we credit the optimal profits in the static leader-follower








We end up with the optimal contract as
w1∗ =
(7− 5α2)a2 − 8(1− α)ah− 16(1 + α)h2











































See the detailed derivation in Appendix A.3.
2.1.4 Leader-follower + Bargaining
For the transitive model with negotiation in period 2, the existence of the optimal
strategic inventory is questioned as its strategic role of forcing supplier to lower
the future wholesale price is contingent. Thus, we proceed with the modelling and
derivation.
Period 2: Follows exactly the discussion of period 2 under cooperation with
Two-time Bargaining in Section 2.1.2 and Appendix A.2.
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Period 1: Supplier and retailer will optimize over their respective two-period
lump-sum profits sequentially as follows. Given a wholesale price w1 quoted by
supplier, retailer aims to determine the sales quantity q1 and the inventory quantity











where Π1R takes the form in (2.1) and Π
2∗
R (I) takes the form in Appendix A.2.
Knowing the retailer’s response denoted by (q1∗(w1), I∗(w1)), supplier aims to















where Π1S takes the form in (2.1) and Π
2∗
R (I) takes the form in Appendix A.2 with
I = I∗(w1), q1 = q1∗(w1). Solving these maximization problems results in an
optimal contract, taking the form
• If 0 ≤ α < 1/2, then
w1∗ =
2(1− α)





2(1− α)b (> 0) if h ≤ h¯1,



















, I∗ = 0 ∀h ≥ 0.
The detailed derivation can be found in Appendix A.4,
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2.2 Comparison and Analysis
We first summarize values of a collection of trading terms and profits for all models
relevant to our discussion in Table 2.1 and will highlight a few substantial findings.
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Theorem 2.1. When full cooperation is conducted between the entities over a
horizon of two periods, regardless of whether they bargain one, modelled in Section
2.1.1, or two times in Section 2.1.2, first-best quantities are procured and retailed
in both periods while no strategic inventories are stored in either optimal contract.
From a pure analytical point of view, the optimal strategic inventories vanish
because the joint utility function for one-time bargaining, attached by a strictly
negative partial derivative in I, is in fact strictly decreasing in I. A consistent
observation is made for the two-time bargaining’s total channel profit function
too. This suggests that under full cooperation, regardless of executing a one-time
or two-time bargaining, any storage of inventories would be a bare burnout of the
channel surplus essentially due to the storage cost incurred.
The analytical result is in fact in accordance with the managerial insight in
the following sense. The bargaining powers simply determine the profit allocation,
the total of which completely come from the market sales with the holding cost
deducted. In comparison with the standard single-period bargaining model where
the first-best solution is established, the storage of strategic inventories would on-
ly bring down both entities’ profits. Recall that in the dynamic model, strategic
inventories play a direct role in forcing supplier to cut down the future wholesale
price she is to quote; yet, a gap for wholesale prices across period is anticipated in
neither bargaining model, nor is there any intermission in a one-time bargaining
where both entities commit to the contract which is pre-negotiated at the begin-
ning of period 1. Taking into account the additional inventory holding cost, any
strategic inventory is precluded.
To conclude, by implementing the double-bargaining framework, strategic in-
ventories are no longer in the picture. In fact, either form of the full cooperation
achieves the same effect as a centralized system, under which the chain is not
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incentivized to pay for the extra storage cost while no additional benefit is avail-
able. This is rather plausible, now that the retailer is empowered to take part in
determining wholesale prices on the entire time horizon via bilateral negotiation-
s. Retailer needs not, and will not store any inventories in exchange for a lower
future wholesale price, since bargaining will simply accomplish that. Meanwhile,
the channel reaches its first-best profit, especially when no holding cost is drained
from the chain.
Moving on to the “bargaining + leader-follower” model, due to the implemen-
tation of a bilateral negotiation, we focus on the channel profit for comparisons to
other models. Considering the different nature of the two frameworks, we separate
investigations on channel profit in periods 1 and 2, attempt comparisons of channel
profit in period 2 to other models, and finally end up with some neat analytical
results.
Theorem 2.2. For the transitive model in Section 2.1.3 shifting from cooperation
to leader-follower,
i) first-best optimal is secured in period 1;
ii) strategic inventories indeed trim the channel’s loss by alleviating double marginal-
ization; in optimal contract, an amount of I∗ = (a− 4h)/2b inventories are
carried forward if a > 4h is assumed, and the optimal inventory quantity is
chosen to maximize the recovery of channel profit from double marginaliza-
tion;
iii) even with the inventories holding cost deducted, the optimal channel profit in
period 2 still prevails the average-by-period optimal in both the commitment
and the dynamic model.
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Note that the assumption a − 4h > 0 has been made in the dynamic model
for the feasibility of strategic inventories.
We list down a collection of profits for comparisons. Superscripts “c”, “d”,
“blf” are used to denote respective quantities in commitment, dynamic and “bar-
gaining + leader-follower” models. The notation Π represents the average profit
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The nature of the leader-follower game invokes the presence of strategic inventories,
which is shown to contribute to an elevated channel profit; see [1]. In our study
of the “bargaining + leader-follower” setting, inventories continue to play this
strategic role and further weakens the double marginalization effect.
As a by-product, we also obtain the gaps between respective channel profits
and the first-best wherever leader-follower occurs and double marginalization effect
applies, and we adopt the notation ΠL with proper superscripts to represent these
differences/losses.



















L with first equality holds when I = 0.
The last inequality shows that by holding a proper amount of inventories,
the channel profit in period 2 is strictly better-off than dynamic and commitment
cases; in other words, bargaining in period 1 inherently magnifies the strategic role
of inventories reducing double marginalization.
In fact, from a managerial point of view, the bargaining framework in period
1 incentivizes supplier and retailer, both being forward-looking, to act so that the
channel profit is maximized, i.e. (q1∗ = a/2b, I∗ = (a − 4h)/2b) is chosen. The
bargaining powers 1−α and α determine the allocation of the total channel profit,
which is realized via supplier’s pricing of w1.
To discuss into more details, the inventories’s role of forcing supplier to quote
a lower wholesale price in period 2 is still effective. Hence, anticipating to go
into a leader-follower setting, retailer practices her right to preserve inventories
and will place the order during negotiation. In period 1, negotiation ensures first-
best sales quantity is implemented, and the profit increment in period 2 due to
a lessened double marginalization effect sourced from strategic inventories will be
allocated to both firms proportional to their bargaining powers. Since no double
marginalization occurs in period 1, the overall chain coordination over the entire
horizon outperforms that of dynamic leader-follower contracting, yet could not
match the centralized chain coordination as in Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2.
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Theorem 2.3. For the transitive model in Section 2.1.4 shifting from leader-
follower to cooperation, in period 2’s bargaining game,
i) first-best optimal is accomplished;
ii) the profit allocation to supplier and retailer may no longer be proportional
to their bargaining powers. On the contrary, when I 6= 0 is carried forward,
retailer’s bargaining power vis-a-vis supplier is effectively enlarged.
From retailer’s stand, the initiative to hold strategic inventories (to force
supplier to lower next period wholesale price) seemed rather out of the picture
due to the fact that a pre-arranged negotiation will occur in the future and the
wholesale price will be a mutually agreed decision.
However, an interesting finding shows that allowing strategic inventories changes
the negotiation outcome, namely
Πlfb,2∗S (I) = (1− α)
((a− 2bI)+)2
4b




in comparison with a standard static bargaining result,
Πb∗S = (1− α)
a2
4b




while maintaining the same optimal channel profit under reasonable levels of s-
trategic inventories, i.e.
Πlfb,2∗S (I) + Π
lfb,2∗











That being understood, a procurement of strategic inventories in advance will alter
the profit allocation in the future period. Such a reverse of right certainly comes
at a cost, one being the additional holding cost, which is in fact drained from
the channel, the other being the possible and plausible wholesale price gap across
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periods, plausible in a way that to defend her primitive share of profit in period 2,
supplier has an intention to quote a high wholesale price in period 1 to obstruct
retailer from storing inventories.
The essence of this potential power play enters as a consequence of an un-
derlying structural reconstruction. Instead of a coordinated system with fixed
profit allocation ratio, retailer can now use the inventories to induce a Cournot-
like supply-side competition (against the monopolistic supplier) in period 2, which
could eventually sanction her a larger share of pie. Alternatively, strategic inven-
tories can be seen as a contracting tool to increase retailer’s bargaining power.
Next, we will examine supply chain’s performance in period 1.
Theorem 2.4. For the transitive model in Section 2.1.4, the optimal contract
depends on parameters α, the bargaining power index and h, the inventories holding
cost.
i) The model decouples in effect into a static leader-follower and a one-period




ii) When 0 ≤ α < 1/2 and (1−α)(1−2α)a
3−2α < h <
(1−2α)a
2
, the inventory quantity
I∗ = 0 appears in the optimal contract; however, retailer’s tendency in hold-
ing inventories threatens supplier and causes a mark-up in w1∗ = (1−α)a−h
and a lower q1∗ consequently. i.e. profit loss due to double marginalization
is exacerbated. Profit margin for both entities shrinks, but supplier draws
a larger fraction from channel surplus in contrast to static leader-follower
game.
iii) An amount of strategic inventories I∗ = (1−2α)a
2b
− h
2(1−α)b is purchased by
retailer in period 1 if 0 ≤ α < 1/2 and h ≤ (1−α)(1−2α)a
3−2α . The strategic
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inventories effectively change both w1∗ and q1∗, and both entities suffer from
a further loss of profit.
In conclusion, in terms of channel profit, supply chain in period 1 underperforms,
if not equally well as, the static leader-follower model.
We have seen from the above theorem a reverse of the strategic role of in-
ventories in this particular stylized model Section 2.1.4, namely retailer’s ability
in carrying inventories intensifies the double marginalization effect and can hurt
both entities’ profits. In fact, retailer bears a larger fraction of the loss if there is
any.
Mathematically, ΠS is a piecewise concave function. To be more specific,















suggests the additional procurement revenue from sales of I could not compensate
supplier’s future loss due to a diminished bargaining power. Meanwhile, note that







is decreasing in w1. With 1/2 ≤ α ≤ 1, the
optimal wholesale price in period 1 chosen by supplier as if the strategic inventory
I vanished (i.e., w1 =
a
2
) is even higher than that as if the strategic inventories were
held (i.e., w1 = 2(1−α)




the wholesale revenue in period 1 and help to achieve the maximal profit ΠS2 =
αa2
4b
in period 2 by driving I to 0 regardless of h, which leads to an indubitable choice
of w1∗ = a
2
.
From an economic point of view, when retailer already has a relatively large
bargaining power, she has held on to quite a segment of the second period channel
profit such that any growth in her portion would not be significant enough for an
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early procurement to pay off. Hence, retailer carries forward empty inventories
regardless, and the dynamic framework decouples in effect into a one-period static
leader-follower model and a standard one-period bargaining, the optimal of the







When 0 ≤ α < 1/2, firstly recognize that retailer is more motivated than in
previous case to hold inventories strategically now that she has a larger fraction of
pie to compete for. Anticipating such, supplier is incentivized to take an action to
avoid her foreseeable loss, and her final decision is closely related to the holding
cost. Under a relatively high holding cost h > (1−2α)a
2
, the strategic inventories
are understood as infeasible and the model again decouples in effect into a static
leader-follower and a one-period bargaining.








supplier could raise w1 to limit the amount of inventories to prevent/reduce suppli-
er’s second period profit loss; however, an increase in w1 will cut q1 as well, which
also hurts supplier’s, retailer’s and channel profits. For a relatively low holding
cost h ≤ (1−α)(1−2α)a
3−2α , in order to deprive retailer’s storage of inventories, supplier
must price rather high in period 1, which hurts her wholesale revenue too much.
Hence, supplier will accommodate and simply optimizes her overall profit with the
sales of strategic inventories included, and an optimal w1∗ = 2(1−α)a
3−2α is chosen.




, supplier can and will quote a high wholesale price in period 1 to avoid
retailer from holding inventories which is anticipated to be used against supplier
herself during period 2 bargaining; but too high a wholesale price is likely to hurt
her wholesale revenue too. Such a procurement unit cost w1∗ = (1 − α)a − h is
just high enough to refrain retailer from storing strategic inventories, and is thus
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To sum up, for the transitive model from leader-follower to bargaining, retailer
has a higher incentive to carry over strategic inventories to alter period 2’s negoti-
ation outcome when her bargaining power is relatively low, namely 0 ≤ α < 1/2,
and only manages to do so under a relatively low storage cost h ≤ (1−α)(1−2α)a
3−2α , as
a consequence of supplier’s pricing strategy analyzed as above.




falls into respective domains ranging from high to low; these w1∗’s are verifiably in
an ascending order. Note that as the wholesale price goes up, the first period sales
quantity shrinks and moves farther away from the static leader-follower optimal
as well as the first-best optimal, which indicates a constantly cut-down channel
profit on period 1’s sales. The appearance of strategic inventories would not reverse
period 2’s channel profit, which, being a product of cooperation, remains the first-
best optimal; however, it will harm the total channel profit for the storage is
charged.
When strategic inventories are feasible, double marginalization in period 1
is worsened as compared to static leader-follower setting, regardless of whether





. Whenever a higher w1 is charged, q1 is pushed farther away from
qfb = a
2b
. On top of that, the channel profit can go even lower when additional
inventory holding cost is incurred.
While retailer realizes she could take advantage of the strategic inventories
to induce a Cournot-like supply-side competition in period 2 in order to virtually
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enlarge her bargaining power (and she may as well do so), supplier feels threatened,
and the double marginalization is intensified whenever strategic inventories are
feasible. The chain becomes less coordinated, which accounts for a diminished
channel profit.
Chapter3
Models and Analysis of Double Supply
Chains with Horizontal Competition,
Vertical Competitions and Cooperations
In the previous chapter with the focus on single supply chain of one product, by
implementing bargaining framework partially or completely, we have seen exis-
tence of strategic inventories under certain settings, and absence in the others,
due to various reasons with similar or opposite roles that inventories may play.
Over the entire time horizon, if supplier and retailer stick to the leader-follower
game, strategic inventories can lift the sales quantities towards the first-best opti-
mal and increase channel’s surplus, and are thus, carried; if supplier and retailer
are in full cooperation, first-best sales quantities are always procured and retailed,
and no inventories are necessary. When the supply chain is in a transition phase
from a non-cooperative game to cooperative, or vice versa, the strategic role of
inventories, the ability and consequences of carrying inventories can vary remark-
ably. When supply chain converts from negotiation to leader-follower, inventories
continue to play a role to stimulate procurement and retailing from which both
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entities mutually benefit. In contrast, when supply chain is in transit from leader-
follower contracting to bargaining, the inventories are anticipated to implicitly
enlarge retailer’s bargaining power, thus, intensify the horizontal competition and
worsen the double marginalization effect.
Having seen a great deal on optimal contracts of single supply chain, we
are motivated to see by introducing horizontal competition into the system, how
much will the supply chain performance and management deviate, and what will
trigger strategic inventories. Moreover, are there other roles of inventories to be
discovered? With these questions in mind, we set up the following models and will
present our results, analysis and interesting findings in this section.
Closely following Chapter 2, we now study a collection of models with similar
settings applied to two chains, between which the horizontal (inter-chain) quantity-
setting competition is introduced. These two chains, each consisting of a single
supplier and a single retailer, conducting sales of two substitutable products with
substitute intensity indexed by θ under linear demand curves, full information
and no uncertainty. We restrain our study on a symmetric case with the market
clearing price for product i given by p(qi, qj) = a− bqi − θbqj, where qi, qj are the
sales quantities of product i 6= j ∈ 1, 2 respectively. All other parameters remain
the same as in Chapter 2.
We first recap that, with horizontal competition, the first-best outcome for




for both chains in each
period. (Here the additional superscript 2 is to respect double-chain models to
differentiate from quantities for single chain models.) Managerially, such a pair of
sales quantities is only achieved if two supply chains form a cartel with the first-best





achieved for either chain. In static (single-period)
double-chain leader-follower model, as well as the two-period commitment model
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(where no inventory is allowed), the optimal sales quantity in equilibrium is qc
2∗ =
2a













Such a gap in channel profit arises from both the vertical competition, where
double marginalization is a major liability, as well as the horizontal competition
that the quantity-setting game compels the sales quantities a pair of strategic
complements. These two types of competition seem to jointly confine two chains’
sales quantities further down below the first-best outcome, fertilize the soil to plant
seeds of strategic inventories and convey us valid reasons to investigate double-
chain models. On top, when intra-chain bargainings are implemented, vertical
competition is cut out, which may provide us with a better vision for an anticipated
battle between strategic inventories versus the horizontal competition. Hence, we
proceed our work as such.
3.1 Models and Results
Consider a two-period model of two parallel supply chains i = 1, 2, each consisting
of a single manufacturer and a single retailer conducting wholesale and retail busi-
ness of a single product. The two goods are substitutes to each other with both
unit production costs normalized to zero. Under a pair of sales quantities (q1, q2),
the market-clearing price for product 1 is given by p(q1, q2) and for product 2 is
given by p(q2, q1), where p(x, y) := a − bx − θby and θ ∈ [0, 1] is the substitute
intensity. Throughout the section of double-chain models, we use pti to denote the
market-clearing price for product i in period t, i = 1, 2, t = 1, 2 if no confusion
aries.
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3.1.1 Dynamic Leader-follower
Under a dynamic leader-follower model, at the beginning of period t = 1, 2, supplier
i = 1, 2 simultaneously quote a wholesale price wti per unit which instantaneously
appear as public information to both chains. Observing these wholesale prices,
retailers respond at the same time with a purchase quantity Qti. In period 1
upon procurement, retailers further simultaneously determine their sales quantities
q1i ≤ Q1I and hold the rest Ii = Q1i −q1i as inventories with a unit inventory holding
cost of h incurred. In period 2 after placing the order, retailers sell all the goods on
hand of quantities of q2i = Q
2
i+Ii to the market. The objective of the manufacturers
and the retailers is to maximize their profits respectively. The two-period game is
modelled as follows.
Period 2: Recall that in period 2, the strategic inventories I1 and I2 carried
from period 1 have been known to both chains. Provided a pair of wholesale
prices (w21, w
2
2) quoted by suppliers, retailers independently determine their sales
quantities q21 and q
2
2 on account of each other’s response. Each retailer’s individual
will is to maximize her profit if the other retailer’s sales quantity is given. For








1 − w21(q21 − I1)
}
.
The competing effect between two retailers establishes an equilibrium on (q21, q
2
2)
using the optimal individual responses. Solving this equilibrium results in retailers’










2)) conditional on the wholesale prices quoted
by suppliers.
Knowing retailers’ response, suppliers needs to independently determine their
wholesale prices also taking account of the other supplier’s action. Their individual
will is similar to retailer, to maximize the profit if the other supplier’s wholesale
3.1 Models and Results 31















An equilibrium is then established on the pair of wholesale prices (w21, w
2
2), leading
to suppliers’ joint decision (w2∗1 (I1, I2), w
2∗
2 (I1, I2)) .
Period 1: The strategy to make decision is similar to that in period 1 but the
profit to maximize for either supplier or retailer is the total value over two periods.
Taking account to the other retailer’s/supplier’s action leads to an equilibrium and
solving this equilibrium results in the retailers’/suppliers’ joint response. The read-
er may refer to the complicate final result and the detailed derivation in Appendix
B.1.
3.1.2 Cooperation with One-time Bargaining
For chain i, supplier and retailer bilaterally bargain over the wholesale prices
wti and sales quantities q
t
i for both periods t = 1, 2 as well as Ii, the amount
of inventories carried over between periods, all in one shot at the beginning of
period 1, in order to maximize their joint utility established in a generalized Nash
bargaining game with retailer’s bargaining power vis-a-vis supplier indexed by
α ∈ [0, 1]. Storage for each unit of inventories is charged h per period. A failure in
negotiation leads to a zero-profit for both entities. All the other parameters follow
from Section 3.1.1. Let ΠtS1 and Π
t
Ri
, respectively, denote the profit function of







+ Π2Ri . The two-period game is then modelled as follows.
Each chain has to independently make a decision on account of the possible
action of the other chain. The decision for chain i includes wholesales prices w1i , w
2
i ,
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sales quantities q1i , q
2
i and inventory quantity Ii, i = 1, 2. Existence of two chains
makes the joint decision finally becomes an equilibrium point on the individual best
response of each provided the other chain’s action is known. Such an individual








(ΠSi −DSi)1−α(ΠRi −DRi)α | ΠSi ≥ DSi ,ΠRi ≥ DRi
}
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where ΠSi = Π
1
Si


















i − Ii), Π2Ri = p2i q2i − w21(q2i − Ii), (3.2)
DSi = DRi = 0. (3.3)




















, (I∗1 , I
∗
2 ) = (0, 0).










See the detailed derivation in Appendix B.2.
3.1.3 Cooperation with Two-time Bargaining
The double-chain two-time bargaining model follows exactly from the single-chain
two-time bargaining setting in Section 2.1.2 with the only exception that the mar-
ket clearing price is modified. The two-period game is modelled as follows.
Period 2: Each chain has to independently make a decision on account of the
possible action of the other chain. The decision strategy is the same to that of
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double-chain one-time bargaining in Section 3.1.2 but replacing the total utility
function with the utility function in period 2. Therefore, given the inventory
quantities (I1, I2) carried from period 1, the joint decision of two chains is an
equilibrium point on the individual best response, which comes from maximizing








(ΠSi −DSi)1−α(ΠRi −DRi)α | ΠSi ≥ DSi ,ΠRi ≥ DRi
}
,
Period 1: This period is also conceptually the same to the double-chain one-time
bargaining in Section 3.1.2. But the total utility function in the maximization for
deriving each chain’s individual best response for establishing the equilibrium is
differently. We simply assume that the disagreement point is (0, 0), which means
that once the negotiation fails in Period 1, the chain ceases the operation till the
end of Period 2. (Indeed, the result remains the same for any constant disagree-










)α | ΠS1 ≥ DS1 ,ΠR1 ≥ DR1}, (3.4)














(I1, I2) coming from
the optimal solution conditional on (I1, I2) in period 2. The detailed derivation




























2(2− θ2)b , 0
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2(2− θ2)b , 0
)
if θ > 0, h < h¯,
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where
h¯ :=
4− θ2 −√8(2− θ2)
2(2 + θ)
a.









(P1, P1) if h > h¯,
(P1, P1), (P2, P3), (P3, P2) if θ > 0, h = h¯,

















3.1.4 Leader-follower + Bargaining
With a modification in the price function, the transitive model almost duplicates
the setting in Section 2.1.3. Under this framework, period 2 is conceptually the
same as period 2 under cooperation with two-time bargaining in Section 3.1.3;
while period 1 is conceptually the same as period 1 under dynamic leader-follower
model in Section 3.1.1. With detailed discussions in Appendix B.5, we end up
with the optimal contract taking the form
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2(1− α)b if 0 ≤ h ≤ h¯1,
0 if h¯1 < h ≤ h¯2,





2(1− α)θ + (4− θ)2
(2 + θ)(2(1− α)(4− θ) + (4− θ2))b if 0 ≤ h ≤ h¯1,
(α + θ)a+ h
(2 + θ)2b
if h¯1 < h ≤ h¯2,
2a

























2(1− α) (2(1− α)(4− θ)− (4− θ2))
(2 + θ) (2(1− α)(4− θ) + (4− θ2)) a and h¯2 :=
2(1− α)(4− θ)− (4− θ2)






t2 − 4 + θ
2
2(1 + θ)(4− θ)t
)
.


















− (2− θ)(6 + θ)a
2
(2 + θ)2(4− θ)2b −
h(h¯2 − h)+
2(1− α)b ∀h ≥ 0.
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3.1.5 Bargaining + Leader-follower
With a modification in the price function, the transitive model almost duplicates
the setting in Section 2.1.4. Under this framework, period 2 is conceptually the
same as period 2 under dynamic leader-follower model in Section 3.1.1; while
period 1 is conceptually the same as period 1 under cooperation with two-time
bargaining Section 3.1.3. With detailed discussions in Appendix B.5, we end up










(32− 8θ2 + θ4)a− (2 + θ)(4 + θ)(4− θ)2h
(4− θ2)(16 + 8θ − 4θ2 − θ3)b .
3.2 Comparison and Analysis
In double-chain dynamic model in which supplier and retailer play leader-follower
games across periods, concurrence of the horizontal and vertical competitions, on
one hand, does trigger the holding of strategic inventories for both chains, but also
complicates the analysis if we want to separate the effect of either and address the
corresponding strategic roles of inventories in response independently. Through
an analysis of direct and indirect economic effect, we state our findings in the
following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. In the optimal contract in equilibrium for double-chain dynamic
model,
i) inventories are carried by both retailers, each chain’s period 2 sales quantity
is pushed up, and the total channel profit is boosted in comparison with the
optimal outcome in the static double-chain model.
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ii) One strategic role of the inventories is to soothe the vertical competition
by impairing supplier’s monopolistic power in period 2, which is a direct
duplicate of results from the single-chain dynamic model.
iii) Inventories for competitive chains are shown to be strategic substitutes to
each other, unlike the sales quantities which are strategic complement. Since
the inventories partially constitute sales quantities in period 2, they effectively
soften the horizontal competition.
To elaborate further how strategic inventories ease the horizontal competition,






























> 0. This means that I1, I2 are strategic substitutes, meaning an




2 are strategic complements,
meaning q21 is going down when q
2
2 goes up.
Being strategic complements to each other keeps the sales quantities away
from the first-best outcome. Now that a pre-procurement of inventories is al-
lowed, inventories serve as stimulant to each other to purchase more quantities
and push the sales towards to the first-best optimal. This analysis fully focuses
on, contributes to and addresses issues with respect to horizontal competition, and
uncovers an untouched strategic role of inventories.
Next, we will compare bargaining framework with the static leader-follower
as well as first-best outcome in double-chain models. Recall that in single-chain
models, bargaining framework is equivalent to establish a centralized system and
achieves the first-best solutions. We will see otherwise in next theorem.
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Theorem 3.2. i) The optimal contract in equilibrium for one-time bargain-
ing double-chain model mimics in each period the outcome of static (single-










ii) To compare among the optimal solutions for commitment contracting, one-
























C if 2/3 < θ ≤ 1.
Now that we realize horizontal competition changes the whole story and the
dominance of bargaining framework is out, we are motivated to explore on whether
or not strategic inventories will exist and can be a remedy to supply chain coordi-
nation, especially when horizontal competition is intense. It turns out that when
two-time bargaining is conducted, asymmetric equilibria can exist with one chain
indeed holding proper amount of inventories, and inventories have showcased other
duties too.
Theorem 3.3. i) In optimal contracts for model in Section 3.1.3, both chains
copy the optimal contract for static bargaining in period 1.












exist if θ >
































, i.e. both chains are better-off when one chain carries
the inventories.
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Inventories in the optimal contract essentially can be seen as a signalling tool
or one chain’s commitment to the other to sustain a collusive behavior, which does
improve the system coordination.
First, we recognize that at the equilibrium point, one chain chooses to hold
strategic inventories and the other not, and given this strategy profile, both chains
benefit, which confirms that inventories have played a strategic role.
What seems a bit counter-intuitive is that, chain 1 who holds no inventories
will end up with a larger profit than chain 2; yet, chain 2 is still incentivized to carry
over inventories as both chains’ profits are strictly better-off as compared to the
case with no inventories allowed. To understand the inherent reason, we trace back
to the previous theorem and acknowledge that when intra-chain bargaining occurs,
both chains tend to procure too much that the sales quantities overflow/ exceed
the first-best outcome. The equilibrium points suggest that when inventories are
feasible (namely when holding cost is reasonably fair), chain 2 chooses to carry
over inventories strategically to signal to chain 1 that they themselves will commit
to a sales quantity up to the inventories level in future period, inducing chain 1 to a
lower level sales correspondingly. This weakens the quantity competition between
two chains and results in an increase in both chains’ channel profits.
To sum up, an interesting finding appears in the double-chain studies that
two-time bargaining can be greatly different from one-time bargaining when hori-
zontal competition exists. Very much unlike the single-chain models, bargainings
dominance to strategic inventories is changed as it can sometimes intensify the
quantity competition in comparison with the leader-follower game by pushing up
the sales quantity, resulting in a lower channel profits for both chains. On the
contrary, the ability in carrying inventories can be used strategically by one chain
as a commitment to the other to ease up the quantity-setting competition and to
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essentially sustain a collusive behavior, hence, a win-win situation is anticipated.
We will continue to facilitate a brief comparison between the single-chain (in
Section 2.1.4) and double-chain (in Section 3.1.4) leader-follower + bargaining
models results analytically.
Theorem 3.4. i) A similar pattern to single-chain model in the optimal solu-
tion is observed for double-chain, and only symmetric equilibrium exists.
ii) Strategic inventories continue to harm the channel profits by worsening the
horizontal competition.
iii) The quoted period-1 wholesale price at equilibrium for double-chain is uni-
versally lower than that for single-chain model.
iv) The optimal inventory level for double-chain is lower than that of single-
chain, too, if inventories are indeed carried.
Chapter4
Conclusions and Future Research
Inspired by a simple stylized dynamic model, we have delivered our concerns with
comparison and contrast in bargaining framework and the effect of strategic in-
ventories, raised questions in the existence of inventories in optimal contracts as
well as the corresponding supply chain performance, and further addressed issues
regarding the change of supply chain coordination under bargaining when horizon-
tal competition is introduced into the system. We use models to incorporate one
or more of the following characteristics — competition in vertical control, coop-
eration via bilateral bargaining, horizontal competition between retailers sourcing
from independent suppliers — and deduce the respective optimal solutions, based
on which some preliminary perceptions on various roles of strategic inventories are
established, while further managerial insights still await to be discovered. We wrap
up our current studies by a brief summary on the explanatory roles of strategic
inventories in respective models.
When single-chain is concerned, for scenarios when competition exists in ver-
tical controls, strategic inventories can be used to break suppliers monopoly power
and reduce the channel profit loss due to double marginalization effect. Retailer
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can also be incentivized to hold inventories to in effect enhance her bargaining
power when negotiation is to take place. However, if cooperation occurs through-
out the entire time horizon, inventories are not held in optimal contract due to
a drain of additional holding from the channel profit. On the other hand, when
the chain is in a transition phase, supplier intends to avoid such a threat, and
the vertical competition is actually intensified. To consider interactions between
two parallel chains, inventories continue to play strategic roles in vertical controls;
on top of that, other uses are speculated too. Proven to be strategic substitutes
to each other, strategic inventories carried by competitive chains partially consti-
tute their respective sales quantities, and the strategic complementarity between
sales quantities are thus partially replaced. Consequently, larger sales quantities
are realized, the gap to first-best optimal is bridged, and horizontal competition
is softened with both chains mutually benefitted. Lastly, inventories are used as
a commitment tool of one chain to the other to avoid concurrence of large sales
quantities when two-time intra-chain bargaining framework is adopted. Under a
decision of holding inventories beforehand, one chain is to substantially commit
to a pre-determined sales quantity, in order to sustain the collusive behavior to
induce the system to approach the first-best outcome.
The naturally perceived association between strategic inventory and the bar-
gaining power is one of the fundamental motivations that we initiated this study.
We did not incorporate the strategic inventory in the bargaining power mainly
because we, in the first place, wanted to start by investigating to which level is
bargaining able to replace the strategic inventory and whether or not more func-
tionalities are covered. Another reason we did not implement the idea as the
examiner suggested is that, currently, given the limited understanding of the role
that strategic inventory plays, it is hard to identify the other factors implicitly in
the bargaining power. To explore it more toward this direction is also something
43
that has interested us and can be expected in the future studies.
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Appendices
A Single-chain Models
In this section, we will analyse the five two-period single-chain models described
in Section 2.1 and end up with explicit expressions of trading terms and profits.
A.1 One-time Bargaining
In the single-chain model of cooperation with one-time bargaining, the two-period




(ΠS −DS)1−α(ΠR −DR)α | ΠS ≥ DS, ΠR ≥ DR
}
. (4.1)
where DS = DR = 0, and
ΠS = w
1(q1 + I) + w2(q2 − I), ΠR = p1q1 + p2q2 − w1(q1 + I)− w2(q2 − I)− hI.
It is not hard to derive from the KKT conditions that the optimal solution satisfies
α(ΠS −DS) = (1− α)(ΠR −DR). (4.2)
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(The cases α = 0 or α = 1 can be achieved by the continuity argument.) Moreover,
note that
(ΠS −DS) + (ΠR −DR) = p1q1 + p2q2 − hI.
Therefore, we can obtain that if
(
w1∗, w2∗, q1∗, q2∗, I∗
)
is an optimal solution to







p1q1 + p2q2 − hI} .
Benefiting from the separable structure of this optimization problem, we can easily
have
q1∗ = q2∗ =
a
2b
and I∗ = 0.
We further plug these values into (4.2) and then obtain w∗1+w
∗
2 = (1−α)a. Indeed,
there exist infinitely many optimal solutions to (4.1).
A.2 Two-time Bargaining
In the model of cooperation with two-time bargaining, the two-period single-chain
game is modelled as follows.







)α | Π2S ≥ D2S, Π2R ≥ D2R} , (4.3)
where
Π2S = w
2(q2 − I), Π2R = p2q2 − w2(q2 − I), D2S = 0, D2R = p(I)I.
Note that
(Π2S −D2S) + (Π2R −D2R) = p2q2 − p(I)I.
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Using the same argument as in Appendix A.1, we have
α(Π2S −D2S) = (1− α)(Π2R −D2R), (4.4)
and moreover,
q2∗(I) = arg max
q2≥I
{
p2q2 − p(I)I} = (a− 2bI)+
2b
+ I.










(a− 2bI)+)2 and Π2∗R (I) = α4b ((a− 2bI)+)+ p(I)I.




(ΠS −DS)1−α(ΠR −DR)α | ΠR ≥ DR,ΠS ≥ DS
}
,
where DS = DR = 0, and
ΠS = w
1(q1 + I) + Π2∗S (I), ΠR = p
1q1 − w1(q1 + I)− hI + Π2∗R (I).
Note a separable structure in term of (ΠS −DS) + (ΠR −DR) = ΠqC + ΠIC , where
ΠqC = p




(a− 2bI)+)2 + α
4b
(
(a− 2bI)+)+ p(I)I − hI.
Therefore, using the same argument as in Appendix A.1, we have
q1∗ = arg max
q1≥0
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, Πt∗S = (1− α)Πt∗C , ΠtR = αΠt∗C , t = 1, 2.
A.3 Bargaining + Leader-follower
This two-period single-chain game under the “bargaining + leader-follower” frame-
work is modelled as follows.
Period 2: Presuming an inventory quantity I from period 1 and a wholesale price





p2q2 − w2(q2 − I)} .
It is easy to obtain that the optimal solution is
q2∗(w2) =
(a− 22 − 2bI)+
2b
+ I.
Knowing the response curve of retailer, supplier determines the wholesale price w2
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Period 1: Suppler and retailer jointly determine the wholesale price w1, the sales
quantity q1 and the inventory quantity I, aiming to maximize the utility of profit








1(q1 + I) + Π2∗S (I), ΠR = p
1q1 − w1(q1 + I)− hI + Π2∗R (I),
and the disagreement point (DR, DS) is defined as the profits that retailer and
supplier could achieve when the cooperation fails. Taking into account of the leader
and follower’s roles, we credit the optimal profits in the static leader-follower game








Note a separable structure in terms of (ΠS −DS) + (ΠR−DR) = ΠqC + ΠIC , where
ΠqC = p







Using the same argument as in Appendix A.1, we have
q1∗ = arg max
q1≥0














(7− 5α2)a2 − 8(1− α)ah− 16(1 + α)h2
16(a− 2h) .































Plugging I∗ back into the expressions in period 2, we further have
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A.4 Leader-follower + Bargaining
The two-period single-chain game under the “leader-follower + Bargaining” frame-
work is modelled as follows.
Period 2: The discussion is exactly the same as that of period 2 under cooperation
with Two-time Bargaining in Appendix A.2.
Period 1: Given a wholesale price w1 quoted by supplier, retailer determines the












where Π1R takes the form in (2.1) and Π
2∗
R (I) takes the form in Appendix A.2.
More specifically,
Π1R = p





Spot that ΠR is separable in q
1 and I. Using the first-order optimality condition




























where Π1S takes the form in (2.1) and Π
2∗
R (I) takes the form in Appendix A.2 with
I = I∗(w1), q1 = q1∗(w1). More specifically,
ΠS = w


























if w1 > (1−α)a−h.
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Note that ΠS is a piecewise continuous function with a break point w
1
m = (1 −
α)a − h. Let ΠlS and ΠrS denote the left and right subfunctions, respectively. It























• If h ≤ h¯1, then w1l ≤ w1m, w1r ≤ w1m, and thus w1∗ = w1l .
• If h¯1 < h ≤ h¯2, then wl > wm, wr ≤ wm, and thus w¯1∗ = w1m.
• If h > h¯2, then wl > wm, wr > wm, and thus w¯1∗ = w1r .
Therefore, we conclude that
• If 0 ≤ α < 1/2, then
w1∗ =
2(1− α)





2(1− α)b (> 0) if h ≤ h¯1,




, I∗ = 0 if h > h¯2.




, I∗ = 0 ∀h ≥ 0.
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B Double-chain Models
In this section, we will analyse the five two-period double-chain models described
in Section 3.1 and end up with explicit expressions of trading terms and profits.
B.1 Dynamic Leader-follower
In the model of dynamic leader-follower framework, the two-period double-chain
game is modelled as follows.
Period 2: Recall that in period 2, the strategic inventories I1 and I2 carried from
period 1 have been known to both chains. Provided a pair of wholesale prices
(w21, w
2
2) quoted by suppliers, retailers aim to determine their sales quantities q
2
1
and q22 on account of each other’s response. From retailer 1’s perspective, given











1 − w21(q21 − I1)
}
.
The solution to this optimization problem is
q¯21 = max
{





Meanwhile, from retailer 2’s perspective, given retailer 1’s sales quantity q21, her
decision q¯22 is symmetric, i.e.,
q¯22 = max
{





The competing effect forces us to establish an equilibrium to find their joint re-








≥ I2. This assumption can be ex-
plained as strategic inventories of retailers are bounded by a certain level. (In-
deed, I1 ≤ (2+θ−θ2)a−(4+θ−θ2)w1+2w22(4−θ2)b and I2 ≤ (2+θ−θ
2)a−(4+θ−θ2)w2+2w1
2(4−θ2)b .) Under this
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(2− θ)a+ θw2 − 2w1







(2− θ)a+ θw1 − 2w2
(4− θ2)b .
We then help each supplier to determine her wholesale price, taking account
of the other supplier’s action. Take supplier 1 for example. Her will is similar to















The optimal solution to this maximization problem is
w¯21 =
(2− θ)a− (4− θ2)bI1 + θw22
4
.
Supplier 2’s perspective gives a symmetric decision w¯22 if supplier 1’s wholesale
price w21 is given. An equilibrium is then established on the pair of wholesale
prices (w21, w
2



















Substituting (w2∗1 , w
2∗
2 ) back, we have






a+ (8− θ2)bI1 − 2θbI2
)
,




(4 + θ)(6− θ2)
2 + θ
a− (8− 3θ2)bI1 − θ(6− θ2)bI2
)
.
Using the same argument leads to symmetric expressions of q2∗2 , p
2∗
2 . Then we can
obtain the profits of suppliers and retailers under the optimal solution are









a− 4bI1 − θbI2
)2
,
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Period 1: The strategy to make decision is similar to that in period 1 but the
profit to maximize for either supplier or retailer is the total value over two periods.
Presuming a pair of wholesale prices (w11, w
1
2) quoted by suppliers, if retailer 2’s
decision is given, i.e., the inventory quantity I2 and the sales quantity q
1
2, retailer














1−w11(q11+I1)−hI1 and Π2∗R1(I1, I2) comes from period 2. This two-










ΠIR1 := −(w11 + h)I1 + Π2∗R1(I1, I2)
}
.
By the first-order optimality condition, the solution to the first maximization
problem is
q¯11 =
(a− w11 − θbq12)+
2b
,
and the solution to the second maximization problem is
I¯1 =
[
(4 + θ)(96− 24θ2 + θ4)a− θ(2 + θ)(96− 24θ2 + θ4)bI2 − (2 + θ)(16− θ2)2w11
− (2 + θ)(16− θ2)2h]/[2(2 + θ)(192− 64θ2 + 3θ4)b].
The same argument can also be applied to retailer 2 to reach the symmetric ex-
pressions of the corresponding quantities q¯12 and I¯2. For simplicity, we assume that
a − w11 − θbq1∗2 ≥ 0 and a − w11 − θbq1∗1 ≥ 0. Knowing the individual response of
each retailer, we then solve the equilibrium to obtain retailer’s joint response on






(2− θ)a− 2w11 + θw12







(48− 24θ − 4θ2 + θ3)(96− 24θ2 + θ4)a+ θ(4 + θ)(4− θ)(96− 24θ2
+ θ4)w12 − 2(4 + θ)(4− θ)(192− 64θ2 + 3θ4)w11 − (2 + θ)(4 + θ)(4− θ)2
(48− 24θ − 4θ2 + θ3)h]/[(4− θ2)((48 + 24θ + 4θ2)2 − θ6)b],
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and q1∗2 and I
∗





We then derive suppliers’ decisions of the wholesale prices. From supplier 1’s
perspective, given supplier 2’s wholesale price w12, supplier 1 aims to maximize its










































and Π2∗S1 takes the form as in the discus-












2). By using the first-order
optimality condition, we can obtain the solution to this maximization problem as
w¯11 =
[
2(10616832− 5308416θ − 8699904θ2 + 4239360θ3 + 2408448θ4 − 1124352θ5
− 271616θ6 + 117632θ7 + 14272θ8 − 5648θ9 − 344θ10 + 124θ11 + 3θ12 − θ13)a
+ 2θ(4423680− 360038θ2 + 978944θ4 − 105728θ6 + 5264θ8 − 120θ10 + θ12)w12
− (2 + θ)(4 + θ)(4− θ2)(36864− 36864θ − 15360θ2 + 19200θ3 + 640θ4 − 2304θ5
− 16θ6 + 88θ7 − θ9)] / [4(10027008− 8306688θ2 + 2321408θ4 − 261376θ6
+ 13760θ8 − 336θ10 + 3θ12)]
The derivation for w¯12 is similar. Then solving the equilibrium results in suppliers’







2(10616832− 5308416θ − 8699904θ2 + 4239360θ3 + 2408448θ4
− 1124352θ5 − 271616θ6 + 117632θ7 + 14272θ8 − 5648θ9 − 344θ10 + 124θ11
+ 3θ12 − θ13)a− (2 + θ)(4 + θ)(4− θ)2((5013504 + 147456θ − 4116480θ2
− 129024θ3 + 1128448θ4 + 37376θ5 − 121344θ6 − 3904θ7 + 5904θ8
+ 160θ9 − 128θ10 − 2θ11 + θ12)h] / [2(4− θ)(5013504 + 147456θ
− 4116480θ2 − 129024θ3 + 1128448θ4 + 37376θ5 − 121344θ6 − 3904θ7
+ 5904θ8 + 160θ9 − 128θ10 − 2θ11 + θ12].
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Substituting w1∗1 , w
1∗





2(141557760 + 14155776θ − 130940928θ2 − 12386304θ3 + 44531712θ4
+ 4055040θ5 − 7110656θ6 − 659456θ7 + 601088θ8 + 62464θ9 − 27776θ10
− 3424θ11 + 656θ12 + 96θ13 − 6θ14 − θ15)a− (2 + θ)(4 + θ)(4− θ2)
(8847360 + 884736θ − 7077888θ2 − 663552θ3 + 1861632θ4
+ 161280θ5 − 184832θ6 − 14336θ7 + 8064θ8 + 512θ9 − 152θ10 − 6θ11
+ θ12)
] / [
(2− θ)(48 + 24θ − 4θ2 − θ3)(5013504 + 147456θ
− 4116480θ2 − 129024θ3 + 1128448θ4 + 37376θ5 − 121344θ6 − 3904θ7
+ 5904θ8 + 160θ9 − 128θ10 − 2θ11 + θ12)].
B.2 One-time Bargaining
For chain i, supplier and retailer bilaterally bargain over the wholesale prices
wti and sales quantities q
t
i for both periods t = 1, 2 as well as Ii, the amount
of inventories carried over between periods, all in one shot at the beginning of
period 1, in order to maximize their joint utility established in a generalized Nash
bargaining game with retailer’s bargaining power vis-a-vis supplier indexed by
α ∈ [0, 1].
Provided that chain 2’s wholesale prices w12, w
2





































1 − w11(q11 + I1)− w21(q21 − I1)− hI1,
DS1 = DR1 = 0.
Note that
(ΠS1 −DS1) + (ΠR1 −DR1) = p11q11 + p21q21 − hI1.



































and I¯1 = 0.
A similar argument results in the expression of q¯12, q¯
2
2 and I¯2 for chain 2, which
are symmetric to that for chain 1. Each chain has to make an independent deci-
sion on account of the other chain’s action. Therefore, solving the corresponding




















, (I∗1 , I
∗
2 ) = (0, 0),










B Double-chain Models 60
B.3 Two-time Bargaining
The double-chain two-time bargaining model follows exactly from the single-chain
two-time bargaining setting in Section 2.1.2 with the only exception that the mar-
ket clearing price is modified. The two-period game is modelled as follows.
Period 2: Each chain has to independently make a decision on account of the
possible action of the other chain. Given the inventory quantities (I1, I2) carried
from period 1, the joint decision of two chains is an equilibrium point on the
individual best response, which comes from maximizing the total utility function.
From chain 1’s perspective, if the sales quantity q21 of chain 2 is given, chain 1 aims













1 − I1), Π2R1 = p21q21 − w21(q21 − I1), D2S1 = D2R1 = 0.
Using the same argument as in Appendix A.1, we obtain that the optimal solution
to (4.6) takes the form
w¯21 = (1− α)
(a− θbq22 − 2bI1)+
2
and q¯21 =
(a− θbq22 − 2bI1)+
2b
+ I1.
Similarly, chain 2’s response with respect to Chain 1 takes the form
q¯22 =
(a− θbq21 − 2bI2)+
2b
+ I2.
Note that retailers’ joint response corresponds to the equilibrium point. We then
divide the discussion into four cases.
Case 1:  a− θbq
2
2 − 2bI1 ≥ 0,
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By plugging the expression of q¯22 into the expression of q¯
2
1, we obtain a solution
q2∗1 (I1, I2) = q
2∗
2 (I1, I2) =
a
(2 + θ)b
when 0 ≤ I1, I2 ≤ a
(2 + θ)b
.
For this solution, we further have for i = 1, 2,




















Case 2:  a− θbq
2
2 − 2bI1 < 0,







We easily obtain a solution
q2∗1 (I1, I2) = I1, q
2∗






≤ I1 ≤ a
θb
, 0 ≤ I2 ≤ a− θbI1
2b
.
For this solution, we further have











Π2∗S2(I1, I2) = (1− α)
(a− θbI1)2
4b
− (1− α)(a− bI2 − θbI1)I2,
Π2∗R2(I1, I2) = α
(a− θbI1)2
4b
+ (1− α)(a− bI2 − θbI1)I2.
Case 3:  a− θbq
2
2 − 2bI1 ≥ 0,







We easily obtain a solution
q2∗1 (I1, I2) =
a− θbI2
2b






< I2 ≤ a
θb
.
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For this solution, we further have
Π2∗S1(I1, I2) = (1− α)
(a− θbI2)2
4b
− (1− α)(a− bI1 − θbI2)I1,
Π2∗R1(I1, I2) = α
(a− θbI2)2
4b
+ (1− α)(a− bI1 − θbI2)I1,











Case 4:  a− θbq
2
2 − 2bI1 < 0,







We easily obtain a solution
q2∗1 (I1, I2) = I1, q
2∗







For this solution, we further have
Π2∗S1(I1, I2) = 0,
Π2∗R1(I1, I2) = (a− bI1 − θbI2)I1,
Π2∗S2(I1, I2) = 0,
Π2∗R2(I1, I2) = (a− bI2 − θbI1)I2.
Period 1: This period is conceptually the same to the double-chain one-time
bargaining in Section 3.1.3. But the total utility function in the maximization for
deriving each chain’s individual best response for establishing the equilibrium is
differently. We simply assume that the disagreement point is (0, 0), which means
that once the negotiation fails in Period 1, the chain ceases the operation till the
end of Period 2. (Indeed, the discussion below remains the same for any constant










)α | ΠS1 ≥ DS1 ,ΠR1 ≥ DR1}, (4.7)




















1 − w1(q11 + I1)− hI1 + Π2∗R1(I1, I2),




(I1, I2) coming from period 2.
Note that
(ΠS1 −DS1) + (ΠR1 −DR1) = p11q11 − hI1 + Π2∗S1(I1, I2) + Π2∗R1(I1, I2).






is a maximizer to (4.7), then we must have









, I¯1 ∈ arg max
I1≥0
{
ΠIC1 := −hI1+Π2∗S1(I1, I2)+Π2∗R1(I1, I2)
}
.





Now we concentrate on the second maximization. Note that ΠIC1 is a function of I1
whose expression depends on the location of I2. Then we separate the discussion
of the maximizer of ΠIC1 into two cases with respect to different I2.




















< I1 ≤ a− 2bI2
θb
,
(a− bI1 − θbI2 − h)I1 if I1 > a− 2bI2
θb
.
Note that the maximum value of ΠIC1 over the third interval is less than
the maximum value of ΠIC1 over the second interval. Thus, we only need
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to compare the maximum values of ΠIC1 over the first and second intervals.






bt− h)t. This function f attains
its global maximum value [(2−θ)a−2h]
2
8(2−θ2)b at t =
(2−θ)a−2h
2(2−θ2) . Note that over the
first interval ΠIC1 attains its maximum value
a2
(2+θ)2b
at I1 = 0. Define
h¯ :=
4− θ2 −√8(2− θ2)
2(2 + θ)
a.





8(2−θ2)b when h > h¯. Conversely,






















− hI1 if 0 ≤ I1 ≤ a
(2 + θ)b
,
(a− bI1 − θbI2 − h)I1 if I1 > a
(2 + θ)b
.
Consider the function g(t) := (a − bt − θbI2 − h)t. This function g attains
its global maximum value (a−θbI2−h)
2
4b
at t = a−θbI2−h
2b
. Thus, the maximum
values of Π1C1 over the second interval is less than the maximum values of
Π1C1 over the first interval.
Knowing the above, then we can write out the explicit form of the maximizer
of ΠIC1 as follows.
• If h > h¯, then I¯1 = 0 ∀ I2 ≥ 0.



















0 ∀ I2 > a
(2 + θ)b
.
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0 ∀ I2 > a
(2 + θ)b
.
We can apply the same argument from chain 2’s perspective. Knowing each





























2(2− θ2)b , 0
)








2(2− θ2)b , 0
)
if θ > 0, h < h¯,
Correspondingly, the channel profits of Chains 1 and 2 take the form (with the








(P1, P1) if h > h¯,
(P1, P1), (P2, P3), (P3, P2) if θ > 0, h = h¯,

















This result indicates that if the storage cost is lower than a certain threshold,
strategic inventories do help the channel profits of both chains.
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B.4 Leader-follower + Bargaining
With a modification in the price function, the transitive model almost duplicates
the setting in Section 2.1.3. The two-period game is then modelled as follows.
Period 2: Follows exactly the discussion of period 2 under cooperation with two-
time bargaining in Section 3.1.3 and Appendix B.3.
Period 1: Period 1 is conceptually the same as period 1 under the dynamic
leader-follower model in Section 3.1.1, so the discussion is similar to that of period
1 in Appendix B.1. We first derive retailers’ joint response, given a presumed pair
of wholesale prices (w11, w
1
2) quoted by suppliers. From retailer 1’s perspective, if
retailer 2’s inventory quantity I2 is given, her goal will be maximizing the total














1−w11(q11 + I1)−hI1 and Π2∗R1(I1, I2) takes the form as at the end
of period 2 in Section B.1. This two-dimensional maximization problems can be









ΠIR1 := −(w11 + h)I1 + Π2∗R1
}
.
By the first-order optimality condition, the solution to the first maximization
problem is
q¯11 =
(a− w11 − θbq12)+
2b
.
A similar argument applied to retailer 2 results in a symmetric expression for
the correspondingly quantity q¯12. We then solve the equilibrium and obtain the

















(2− θ)a− 2w11 + θw12
(2 + θ)(2− θ)b ,
(2− θ)a− 2w12 + θw11
(2 + θ)(2− θ)b
)
.
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Then we focus on the second maximization problem. The discussion becomes
much more complicated. Note that ΠIR1 is a function of I1 with its expression




two cases with respect to different I2.































(a− bI1 − θbI2 − w1 − h)I1 if I1 > a− 2bI2
θb
.
Note that the values of ΠIR1 over the third interval is dominated by the
values over the second interval. Thus, we only need to compare the values





bt − w11 − h
)
t. This function f attains its global maximum
value
[(2−θ)a−2(w11+h)]2
8(2−θ2)b at t =
(2−θ)a−2(w11+h)




then the maximum value of ΠIR1 over the second interval is less than the
maximum value of ΠIR1 over the first interval. Also note that over the first
































Consider g(t) = (a − bt − θbI2 − (w11 + h))t. This function g attains it-











for any I2 ≥ a(2+θ)b . Thus, the maximum value of ΠIR1
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over the second interval is less than the maximum value of Π1R1 over the first








A similar argument can be applied to retailer 2 to obtain the corresponding
inventory quantity I¯2 with the symmetric expression. Therefore, from the above
brief discussion, we realize that for certain cases, retailers’ joint response could be
not unique since multiple equilibrium points (I∗1 , I
∗
2 ) could exist. In such circum-
stance, suppliers will not be able to decide the optimal pair of wholesale prices
due to the unpredictable reaction of retailers. Therefore, when suppliers are mak-
ing a decision, any candidate pair of wholesale prices leading to unpredictable
retailers response will be rejected. Back to the discussion of I¯1 and I¯2, it means
that suppliers will only consider the candidate pairs of wholesale prices for which






and meanwhile the maximizer of Π1R2 satisfying a symmetric requirement. Under
this circumstance, the maximizer I¯1 should have the following expression and the







































, i = 1, 2.
It is easy to find a sufficient condition on the wholesale prices (w11, w
1
2) to guarantee
the uniqueness of the above joint response, i.e., w1i + h ≥ θ
2
2(2+θ)
a for i = 1, 2.
Indeed, the area of (w11, w
1













but complicated. However, the subsequent discussion does not need the explicit
form of this area for uniqueness. We only need to verify that the final optimal
contract possess the uniqueness at this stage.
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We then help suppliers to determine the wholesale prices. From supplier 1’s
perspective, once supplier 2’s wholesale price w12 is given, supplier 1 will maximize





























2)) takes the form as


















(2− θ)a− 2w11 + θw12
























2(1−α)b and let Π
r
S1
denote the right subfunction with I∗1 = 0. Direct calculation yields that Π
l
S1









. Note that the function ΠS1 depends on w
1
2. Thus, we discuss the






















Note that A < B. Then, we have
Case 1: If w12 ≤ A, then wl ≤ wm, wr ≤ wm, and thus
w¯11 =
2(1− α)(2(2− θ)a+ θw12))
8(1− α) + (2 + θ)(2− θ) .
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Therefore, the quantity w¯11, as a function of w
1
2, has 3 pieces if A > 0, 2 pieces if
A ≤ 0 < B and only 1 piece if B ≤ 0. The result for w¯12 is symmetric.
The disclose of each supplier’s individual best response also us the derive
the suppliers’ joint decision of wholesale prices by straightforward discussion into
cases. Define
h¯1 :=
2(1− α) (2(1− α)(4− θ)− (4− θ2))
(2 + θ) (2(1− α)(4− θ) + (4− θ2)) a and h¯2 :=
2(1− α)(4− θ)− (4− θ2)
(2 + θ)(4− θ) a.
Then we can obtain







2(1− α)(4− θ) + (4− θ2)a if 0 ≤ h ≤ h¯1,
2(1− α)
2 + θ
a− h if h¯1 < h ≤ h¯2,
2− θ
4− θa if h > h¯2.






4− θa ∀h ≥ 0.
Note that for any h¯1 < h ≤ h¯2,
4(1−α)(2−θ)
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Therefore, the sufficient conditions for a unique retailers’ equilibrium point (I∗1 , I
∗
2 )




































a2 − hI∗i i = 1, 2.






. (The equality can only be












∀ i = 1, 2.
By plugging the detailed expression of (w1∗1 , w
1∗
2 ), we further have







2(1− α)b if 0 ≤ h ≤ h¯1,
0 if h¯1 < h ≤ h¯2,





2(1− α)θ + (4− θ)2
(2 + θ)(2(1− α)(4− θ) + (4− θ2))b if 0 ≤ h ≤ h¯1,
(α + θ)a+ h
(2 + θ)2b
if h¯1 < h ≤ h¯2,
2a





























t2 − 4 + θ
2
2(1 + θ)(4− θ)t
)
.


















− (2− θ)(6 + θ)a
2
(2 + θ)2(4− θ)2b −
h(h¯2 − h)+
2(1− α)b ∀h ≥ 0.
It is interesting to note that for both two cases of α, the chain profit of each chain
Π∗Ci , i = 1, 2 increases as the storage cost h increases.
B.5 Bargaining + Leader-follower
With a modification in the price function, the transitive model almost duplicates
the setting in Section 2.1.4. The two-period game is then modelled as follows.
Period 2: Follows exactly the discussion of period 2 under the dynamic leader-
follower in Section 3.1.1 and Appendix B.1.
Period 1: Period 2 is conceptually the same as period 1 under cooperation with
two-time bargaining model in Section 3.1.1, so the discussion is similar to that of
period 1 in Appendix B.1 in Section 3.1.3. From chain 1’s perspective, if chain
2’s sales quantity q12 and inventory quantity I2 are given, the goal of chain 2
would be maximizing its total utility function, in which the disagreement point
should be set to a reasonable outcome once the negotiation fails. Note that if the
negotiation fails in Period 1, chain 1 will take no action in period 1 but continue to
period 2 under the leader-follower framework on account of the possible strategic
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inventories of chain 2. Therefore, the disagreement point should be defined as






(0, I2)), where Π
2∗
S1
and Π2∗R1 take the form as that at
the end of Section B.1 (with I1 = 0). Then the maximization problem of chain 1



















































taking the form as that at the end of Section B.1 (with I1 = 0).
Note that
(ΠS1 −DS1) + (ΠR1 −DR1) = ΠqC1 + ΠIC1 ,







optimal solution to (4.8), then we must have

















(4 + θ)(32− 8θ2 + θ4)a− θ(2 + θ)(32− 8θ2 + θ4)bI2 − (4 + θ2)(4− θ)2h
2(2 + θ)(8− θ2)(8− 3θ2)b .
A similar argument can also be applied to chain 2. The obtained expression
of q¯12 and I¯2 is symmetric to that of q¯
1
1 and I¯1. Then, solving the equilibrium yields
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(32− 8θ2 + θ4)a− (2 + θ)(4 + θ)(4− θ)2h
(4− θ2)(16 + 8θ − 4θ2 − θ3)b .
Name: Gu Weijia
Degree: Master of Science
Department: Department of Decision Sciences, NUS Business School
Thesis Title: Strategic Inventories in Supply Chain Contracts under
Various Configurations of Competition and Cooperation
Abstract
In this thesis we first investigate the existence and the effect of strategic
inventories for a single supply chain where the supplier and the retailer bargain
for the trading terms. For a two-period problem, we consider both the case of
bargaining taking place in both periods and the scenario where the two parties
bargain only in one period. We compare our results with those for the scenario
where the supplier and the retailer trade under a Stackelberg game framework. We
then introduce horizontal competition between supply chains into the system and
study how the impact of strategic inventories changes compared to other settings.
We have shown that strategic inventories do exist in optimal contracts under most
scenarios, and could project different impacts on supply chain performances and
profits.
Keywords: Strategic Inventories, Bargaining, Horizontal Competition, Supply
Chain Coordination.
STRATEGIC INVENTORIES IN SUPPLY
CHAIN CONTRACTS UNDER VARIOUS
CONFIGURATIONS OF COMPETITION AND
COOPERATION
GU WEIJIA
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE
2014
S
T
R
A
T
E
G
IC
IN
V
E
N
T
O
R
IE
S
IN
S
U
P
P
L
Y
C
H
A
IN
C
O
N
T
R
A
C
T
S
U
N
D
E
R
V
A
R
IO
U
S
C
O
N
F
IG
U
R
A
T
IO
N
S
O
F
C
O
M
P
E
T
IT
IO
N
A
N
D
C
O
O
P
E
R
A
T
IO
N
G
U
W
E
IJ
IA
2
0
1
4
